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ABSTRACT 
Agency theory has focused on buyouts as a governance and control device to 
increase profitability, organizational efficiency and limited attention to growth. A 
strategic entrepreneurship view of buyouts incorporates upside incentives for value 
creation associated with growth as well as efficiency gains. In this paper, we develop the 
complementarity between agency theory and strategic entrepreneurship perspectives to 
examine the performance implications for different types of buyouts. Further, we study 
how the involvement of private equity firms is related to the performance of the post-
buyout firm. These issues are examined for a sample of 238 private equity backed 
buyouts in the UK between 1993 and 2003. Implications for theory and practice are 
suggested. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Private equity backed buyouts have been perceived historically as an efficiency 
tool to streamline organizational processes, reduce workforces and decrease unit costs 
(Harris, Siegel, & Wright, 2005; Wright, Hoskisson, & Busenitz, 2000a). Agency theory 
has been the predominant theoretical lens employed to study buyouts, with emphasis on 
controlling and incentivizing managers’ behavior to improve performance (Fox & 
Marcus, 1992; Jensen, 1993). This contrasts sharply with mature, public firms where 
weak corporate governance and managerial incentives can lead to the destruction of firm 
value.  
Besides being efficiency enhancing,  buyouts may also be a vehicle for strategic 
innovation and renewal that fosters upside entrepreneurial growth opportunities (Wright, 
Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Dial, 2001b). While an agency perspective allows for 
consideration of growth, the agency controls involved in private equity transactions, such 
as high leverage and financial monitoring may stifle strategic flexibility and risk-taking 
associated with growth (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
A strategic entrepreneurship perspective, grounded in the resource-based view of 
the firm, provides recognition of the resources required to exploit growth opportunities in 
order to create and sustain competitive advantage (Ireland, Hitt, & Sirman, 2003). The 
complementarity between agency and resource-based perspectives of the firm are well-
recognized (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Makadok, 2003); in 
particular, strong governance and strong resources in the form of human capital 
competences may be especially important in generating performance (Makadok, 2003). 
Exploring the complementarity between agency and strategic entrepreneurship 
perspectives with respect to buyouts provides richer insights than would be gained from 
using only one perspective. These perspectives have not hitherto been combined in the 
context of private equity backed buyouts. 
Previous studies have typically used an agency perspective because they largely 
focused on ‘‘going private’’ buyouts of entire firms that were publicly traded (Jensen, 
1989). Buyouts of publicly traded companies, however, account for only a minority of 
buyouts in the US and are relatively rare in other countries (Wright et al., 2007).  
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Indeed, other types of buyouts, including divisional buyouts, family buyouts and 
secondary buyouts have largely been neglected in previous research. This heterogeneity 
of buyout types offers considerable opportunity for change and entrepreneurial pursuits 
that extend traditional agency theory explanations for buyouts. These different types of 
buyouts have emerged because they are an efficient and effective means of needed 
organizational change (Wright et al., 2000a).  
Synthesizing agency and strategic entrepreneurship perspectives, the first research 
question we examine is: how do different types of private equity backed buyout 
transactions impact post-buyout performance? More specifically, we study the 
performance implications of divisional buyouts versus buyouts from other private 
sources. Previous empirical literature has not focused specifically on divisional buyouts, 
yet we argue they are of particular interest in the context of synthesizing agency and 
strategic entrepreneurship perspectives. First, numerically, they represent substantially 
larger shares of the buyout part of the private equity market than public to private 
transactions (CMBOR, 2007). Second, divisional buyouts often involve firms where 
agency problems were previously significant and where entrepreneurial opportunities 
have been stifled by parental control structures that require conformity and hard objective 
data as a basis for decision-making (Wright, Hoskisson, & Busenitz, 2001a; Wright et al., 
2001b).  
Entrepreneurial firms in general and divisional buyouts in particular may not 
possess all the required resources and capabilities to exploit growth opportunities but may 
seek to acquire them from external partners. These resources and capabilities may be 
provided by private equity firms. Traditional agency perspectives suggest that the 
principal role for private equity firms in buyouts is monitoring. It is long-recognized in 
the venture capital and private equity literature, however, that the human capital of 
financial investors also brings an advisory resource to investees (Dimov & Shepherd, 
2005; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Wright, 2007). The commonality of these roles across 
private equity firms suggests that monitoring and advisory roles per se may not be a 
source of competitive advantage (Barney, 2002). However, some private equity firms may 
be better at developing specialist skills that potentially make an important contribution to 
strategic entrepreneurship in buyouts.  
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The second research question we address in this study, therefore, is how do 
differences in private equity firm experience and intensity of post-buyout involvement 
impact the performance of firms undergoing a buyout?  
Finally, the extent to which private equity firms can add value will depend on the 
type of deals they pursue. The impact of private equity firm experience on firm 
performance, therefore, will be contingent on the type of buyout transaction. For example, 
divisional buyouts offer more opportunities for change and entrepreneurial pursuits 
(Wright et al., 2001a). The third research question we address is: does private equity firm 
experience impact differently on the performance of divisional buyouts  than for other 
buyout types?  
The empirical contexts generally employed to analyze buyouts have focused on 
‘going private’ buyouts. Since, as already noted, public to private transactions actually 
account for only a minority of buyouts in the US and the UK and are relatively rare in 
Continental Europe (Harris et al., 2005), the empirical context employed in this study 
considers private buyout transactions. A unique hand-collected dataset is used that covers 
238 private equity backed buyout transactions in the UK over the period 1993 to 2003. 
The value added by the paper includes the following. First, we contribute to 
extending work on strategic entrepreneurship by considering a context where it is has 
previously not been applied. Private equity backed buyouts represent a context for 
strategic entrepreneurship that is distinct from existing corporations. Specifically, private 
equity backed buyouts introduce important issues of governance and incentives hitherto 
neglected in the strategic entrepreneurship concept. Some firms, such as private equity 
firms, may be better than others at developing and utilizing corporate governance 
mechanisms and hence can create a resource that generates competitive advantage 
(Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001). Buyouts also introduce incentives for management 
that were previously absent. This is important as a strategic competitive advantage may 
not be created where the corporate governance system does not incentivize and monitor 
management to undertake the appropriate actions to recognize opportunities and to gather 
and utilize resources.  
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Second, we add to the literature that has highlighted the complementarity between 
agency theory and the resource-based view by considering a particularly important 
context where changes in ownership reduce agency problems and involve the introduction 
of new resources as well as the release and redirection of existing human capital resources 
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Makadok, 2003). Third, we contribute to the debate on the 
sources of gains in private equity backed buyouts by demonstrating theoretically and 
empirically that performance improvements may derive from value creating activities 
related to both growth and efficiency improvements and not just value capture. Finally, 
we add to a growing body of studies that recognize the heterogeneity of private equity 
firms by focusing specifically on the different resource contributions they can provide.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, we outline the nature of the 
private equity and buyout process, identifying different buyout types. Second, we develop 
our complementary theoretical perspectives of agency and strategic entrepreneurship and 
then derive hypotheses. Third, we outline the research setting of our study, the data and 
method used in the analyses. Fourth, we present the results from the empirical analyses. 
Finally, we discuss our findings, conclude and outline potential avenues for future 
research.   
 
PRIVATE EQUITY AND BUYOUTS 
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) emerged as new organizational forms in the US during 
the 1980s (Kaufman & Englender, 1993). The phenomenon traversed the Atlantic, with 
the first UK LBO of a listed corporation occurring in 1985 (Wright, Robbie, Chiplin, & 
Albrighton, 2000b). Today, buyouts are widespread in Continental European countries 
and Asia (Cumming, Siegel, & Wright, 2007; Wright, 2007).  
Buyouts are the principal focus of private equity investments in which investors 
and a management team pool their own money (usually together with debt finance) to buy 
shares in that company from its current owners, to create a new independent entity. In 
contrast to early stage venture capital investments, which may also involve the purchase 
of a controlling interest, buyouts are equity purchases of companies that are already self-
sustaining but have room for growth and management improvement.  
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Private equity firms become active investors through taking board seats and 
specifying contractual restrictions on the behavior of management which include detailed 
reporting requirements. Lenders also typically specify and closely monitor detailed loan 
covenants (Citron, Robbie, & Wright, 1997).  
The form of the buyout may vary. A management buy-out (MBO) usually involves 
a private equity acquisition in which the existing management takes a substantial proportion 
of the equity, which may be a majority stake in smaller transactions. A management buy-in 
(MBI) (Robbie et al., 1995) is simply an MBO in which the leading members of the 
management team are outsiders.  Although superficially similar to MBOs, MBIs carry 
greater risks as incoming management do not have the benefits of the insiders’ knowledge 
of the operation of the business. Private equity firms have sought to address this problem by 
putting together hybrid buy-in/management buy-outs (so-called BIMBOs) to obtain the 
benefits of the entrepreneurial expertise of the outside managers and the intimate internal 
knowledge of the incumbent management. Investor-led buy-outs (IBOs) involve the 
acquisition of a firm in a transaction led by a private equity firm rather than by insider or 
outsider management teams. The private equity firm will typically either retain existing 
management to run the company or bring in new management to do so, or employ some 
combination of internal and external management. Incumbent management may or may not 
receive a direct equity stake or may receive stock options. IBOs have close similarities with 
traditional LBOs. The differences can be summarized in terms of the metamorphosis of 
LBO Associations into private equity firms as the industry has developed.  
The vendor source of the buyout may also vary, with consequences for pre-buyout 
agency issues. As noted in the Introduction, LBOs have traditionally been associated with 
the taking private of listed corporations with diffuse ownership and agency cost problems. 
But buyouts may emanate from other vendor sources, notably divisions of larger 
corporations and other private vendors such as family owners and private equity owners.  
Divisional buyouts are one of the most common forms of private equity backed 
buyouts, accounting for 41% of the 3,434 from all vendor sources, including publicly 
listed deals, in our hand-collected dataset between 1993 and 2003 in the UK, the period 
covered by this study.  
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A divisional buyout is defined as the sale of a division, subsidiary, or other 
operating unit of a parent firm to members of the management of either the parent or the 
subunit being divested (Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989). Divisional buyouts generally involve 
significant agency cost problems prior to buyout. Agency problems may be present in 
divisions of large, complex corporations where the multi-divisional structure lacks the 
appropriate control and incentive mechanisms (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hill, 1985; 
Thompson & Wright, 1987). Management buyouts of divisions alter the ownership 
structure of corporate assets in a way that can lead to a more efficient and profitable 
allocation of resources. Increasing the amount of equity held by the unit's managers, 
buyouts alter management incentives. By having claims more closely tied to the 
performance of the unit under their control, managers can be expected to improve their 
performance (Hite, 1989). This is because shirking becomes more costly to the individual 
with a share in the net cash flow. Furthermore, the incentives for mutual monitoring by 
members of the management team improve as they become residual claimants. 
In contrast to divisional buyouts, buyouts of family firms and secondary buyouts 
involve low or no agency costs. These deals account for 45% of all buyouts in the period 
covered by our study.1 Buyouts of private or closely held family firms involve a private 
owner who, while seeking to obtain a good price, may also want his or her company to 
remain independent but has not identified a family management successor (EVCA, 2005; 
Howorth, Westhead, & Wright, 2004). Over the past two decades, this form of buyout has 
become a widely accepted form of transferring ownership in privately held firm facing 
succession problems (CMBOR, 2007). In family firms facing succession issues, a buyout 
may often be perceived as the only way for the firm to stay independent. In private and 
family firms there is typically no separation of ownership and control prior to the buy-out 
(Howorth et al., 2004) and hence there is less scope for improvements from improved 
control mechanisms (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004).  
                                                 
 
1
 4% of deals in this period involved public to private buyouts. The balance of 10% of deals involved public 
sector privatizations and buyouts of failed firms 
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Limited agency issues may arise where ownership is dispersed among family 
members (Howorth et al., 2004; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Some 
limited growth opportunities may be available where the private owners have become 
risk-averse in an effort to preserve the wealth they have created.  
In a secondary buyout, an initial buyout deal is refinanced with a new ownership 
structure including, typically, a new set of private equity financiers while the original 
financiers and possibly some of the management exit. Secondary buyouts represent the 
acquisition of an initial buyout where agency cost control mechanisms are already in 
place: significant managerial ownership and leverage, as well as active involvement by 
private equity firms. Much of the impetus for private equity providers to buy portfolio 
companies from other financial investors has come from difficulties in finding other 
sources of exit as corporate restructuring programs passed their peak and as the explosion 
in funding availability placed pressures on private equity firms to invest the funds they 
had raised (Wright, Renneboog, Simons, & Scholes, 2006). 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Agency and strategic entrepreneurship perspectives on management buyouts 
Researchers have generally adopted an agency-based approach to buyouts 
(Renneboog, Simons, & Wright, 2007). Jensen (1989) argues that high leverage, 
increased equity ownership by managers, and monitoring by specialist fund providers 
create an organizational form whose incentive structure leads to profit maximization. 
Using an agency perspective, several empirical studies focusing on public to private 
transactions have found an improvement in the operating performance of the buyout firm 
reflecting these improved governance mechanisms (Holthausen & Larcker, 1996; Kaplan, 
1989; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990).  
Agency theory’s focus on profit maximization confounds the sources of 
improvements in performance as performance is a multi-dimensional construct (Delmar, 
Davidsson, & Gartner, 2003; Hitt, 1988). Profitability, as a measure of performance, may 
increase following buyout as a result of value creation and/or value capture (Coff, 1999). 
Value capture may arise from transfers from other stakeholders.  
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Value creation can be distinguished in terms of improved efficiency and increased 
effectiveness (Peteraf & Barney, 2003). Efficiency relates to an input-output ratio, 
consequently, improved efficiency occurs either when output increases for a given input, 
or less input is required for a given output. To the extent that cost cutting strategies to 
achieve efficiencies have a disproportionately adverse impact on employees, there may 
also be value capture. Effectiveness concerns an absolute level of input acquisitions or 
outcome attainment such as growth (Goodman & Pennings, 1977; Ostroff & Schmitt, 
1993).  
A limitation of agency theory is that it under-emphasizes the upside potential of 
buyouts. The traditional agency approach to buyouts largely focuses on their reduction of 
costs associated with over-diversification and over-investment in mature or declining 
industries with few growth opportunities (Jensen, 1989). Agency controls contribute to 
cutting back on value destroying activities and investments. The outcome of these effects 
is likely an improvement in efficiency (Harris et al., 2005). The agency approach provides 
incentives for managers to seek out profitable opportunities. However, the controls arising 
from high leverage and financial monitoring likely limit managerial discretion and stifle 
flexibility and risk-taking (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Yet, highly leveraged transactions 
may be inappropriate when the debt levels restrict the ability to exploit further growth 
opportunities (Wright et al., 2000a). 
A strategic entrepreneurship perspective, grounded in the resource-based view of 
the firm, provides complementary insights to the agency perspective (Makadok, 2003). 
This perspective recognizes that access to resources and capabilities may be important in 
generating performance, especially value creation through growth (Ireland et al., 2003). 
Growth is an important indicator of entrepreneurial activity (Delmar et al., 2003). 
Generating enhanced performance, therefore, may not simply be a function of designing 
appropriate contracts to control agency problems, which may be problematical where 
performance is multi-dimensional and the environment uncertain (Holmstrom & 
Milgrom, 1991), but may relate to the capabilities of managers to deliver that 
performance (Hendry, 2002). There may thus be important synergies between strong 
governance and strong competence (Makadok, 2003).  
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In a buyout context, these resources and capabilities relate, first, to the 
idiosyncratic skills and tacit knowledge of management to identify opportunities for value 
creation (Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Coff, 1999). This knowledge may be present in 
existing management or may need to be acquired. Prior to buyout, however, managers 
may be unable or unwilling to utilize their knowledge and skills. Second, idiosyncratic 
skills and knowledge relate to the specialist expertise of private equity firms in selecting 
deals and in monitoring and advising management. Private equity firms may provide 
complementary resources and capabilities that may be missing from the management 
team (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). The commonality of these roles across private equity 
firms suggests that selection, monitoring and advisory roles per se may not be a source of 
competitive advantage (Barney, 2002). However, some private equity firms may be much 
more skilled in how they implement otherwise common selection, monitoring and 
advisory devices through learning, thus creating distinctive organizational capabilities 
(Barney et al., 2001; De Clercq & Dimov, 2007). Problems in learning are well-
recognized (Bukszar & Connolly, 1988; Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995; Lieberman, 1989). 
Differences in private equity firms’ capacity to learn from their experience and upgrade 
organizational capabilities allows some of them to sustain their competitive advantage. 
The capacity to adapt, extend and reconfigure capabilities is an important dynamic 
capability that allows firms to compete more effectively in highly competitive market 
environments (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). 
Building on these ideas, we argue that buyouts should be seen as more than tools 
to facilitate cost efficiencies as a means of value creation, but also as a means to stimulate 
strategic change that enables growth opportunities to be realized (Wright et al., 2000a). 
Several studies have explicitly drawn attention to entrepreneurial activity in buyouts. For 
example, Bull (1989) provides evidence of the entrepreneurial impact of management 
buyouts and Malone (1989) and Wright, Thompson and Robbie (1992) also cite evidence 
of new product innovation. Other research indicates that substantial increases in new 
product development, technological alliances, and R & D staff occur after a buyout 
(Zahra, 1995).  
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Agency and strategic entrepreneurship perspectives in divisional buyouts 
Large organizations typically develop elaborate policies, procedures, and 
organizational structures to clearly define decision-making responsibilities and reduce 
decision uncertainty. Where the diversified corporation’s existing governance or 
remuneration structure truncates divisional managerial incentives and rewards, the 
opportunity for a buyout may exist (Wright, Thompson, Chiplin, & Robbie, 1991). From 
an agency perspective, the introduction of incentive and monitoring mechanisms in a 
buyout may lead to increased profitability, particularly from efforts to reduce costs and 
improve efficiency.  
Divisional buyouts may also be initiated where managers recognize growth 
opportunities that are constrained by organizational structures (Wright et al., 2000a). 
These divisional buyout opportunities often represent under-investment situations by the 
parent firm, especially where the division may be peripheral to a parent’s strategy. In 
complex organizations, internal capital markets may not always function in a competitive 
manner, so that divisions with profitable investment opportunities may be disadvantaged 
if their division is not regarded as strategically central to the parent organization 
(Hoskisson & Turk, 1990). With a planned internal capital market, the scope for 
divisional-level initiators is very limited (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988).  
In this context, managerial effort and motivation may be lacking or misdirected 
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991, 2001). On one hand, managers with tacit knowledge or 
idiosyncratic skills in their particular domain may recognize new opportunities for growth 
but may be prevented by a bureaucratic corporate control structure from implementing the 
entrepreneurial growth opportunities they identify (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Green, 
1992). To convince corporate management to support these ideas may be problematical 
where corporate decision systems require hard supporting data for new investment 
proposals. By their nature, however, such opportunities may rely on subjective 
information and tacit knowledge of managers. On the other hand, managers in divisions 
may also be in a weaker bargaining position prior to buyout to capture returns from their 
tacit knowledge and idiosyncratic skills; governance and remuneration schemes may not 
adequately incentivize the performance of managers in individual divisions  (Makadok, 
2003).  
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To obtain a share of the gains that reflect the contribution of their tacit knowledge 
or idiosyncratic skills, they may seek to undertake a management buyout that would give 
them a significant equity stake (Coff, 1999; Castanias & Helfat, 2001).  
Severing ties with the corporate infrastructure can increase buyout managers’ 
flexibility to more freely initiate and pursue various value creating activities (Wright et 
al., 2001a). Evidence from divisional managers regarding the reason for buyouts provides 
further support for this entrepreneurial perspective (Wright et al., 1991). Green (1992) 
reports that buyout ownership allowed managers to perform tasks more effectively 
through greater independence.  
These problems are likely lower in other private buyouts and hence there is less 
scope for improvements in performance arising from efficiency improvements and growth 
(Chrisman et al., 2004). In family firms, owner-managers with substantial equity stakes 
have incentives to seek out profitable opportunities and as peak-tier coordinators have the 
flexibility to implement new opportunities they identify (Howorth et al., 2004); both of 
these aspects are absent in divisional cases. The prospects for gains arising from resolving 
any agency problems may be limited to those cases where ownership was dispersed 
before the buyout (Howorth et al., 2004; Schulze et al., 2001), which appear to represent a 
small proportion of family firm buyouts (EVCA, 2003) (EVCA, 2005). Limited growth 
opportunities may be available after the buyout where the private owners had become 
risk-averse in an effort to preserve the wealth they have created, assuming that the second 
tier management taking over are able to identify and implement such 
opportunities(Wright et al., 2001b).  
Secondary buyouts provide a means to continue the buyout organizational form, 
albeit with a different set of investors. In contrast to managers in divisions of larger 
corporations, the initial buyout involves equity stakes by management, control by private 
equity firms, and pressure from leverage. Effort to reduce costs in buyouts is usually 
focused on the first two to three years after the buyout (Seth & Easterwood, 1993; 
Wiersema & Liebeskind, 1995). Beyond this period, it may be difficult to obtain further 
cost reductions and efficiency improvements.  
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The introduction of an amended incentive and governance structure on second 
buyout, such as increased managerial equity stakes and loosened controls by private 
equity firms, may facilitate improved performance through pursuit of growth 
opportunities. However, given that the first buyout will have given scope and incentives 
for growth, the scope for growth improvements is likely less than for divisional buyouts.  
To summarize, divisional buyouts often act as a stronger mechanism to ‘unlock’ 
profitability, efficiency and growth strategies previously constrained by inefficient 
organizational structures than in other types of private buyout. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
H1a: Divisional buyouts will show higher changes in profitability compared to 
other buyouts. 
H1b: Divisional buyouts will show higher changes in efficiency compared to other 
buyouts. 
H1c: Divisional buyouts will show higher levels of growth compared to other 
buyouts. 
 
Private equity firms and post-buyout performance 
As we have argued, buyouts need to structure their resource portfolio by acquiring 
resources as needed and creating the capabilities to identify and exploit growth 
opportunities. Buyouts may not possess all the resources and capabilities that they require 
to exploit growth opportunities but may seek to acquire them from external partners 
through their networks (Ireland et al., 2003; Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001). Social capital 
theory suggests that firms should pursue strategies focusing on the development of 
networks with external resource holders as a valuable resource to enhance performance 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002). In the context of management buyouts, private equity investors’ 
networks may help them source better deals and put them in a position to provide 
resources and capabilities the management of the buyout firm is currently missing. 
Especially in buyouts with value creating opportunities, private equity firms can play a 
significant role in adding value to the post buyout firm as these buyouts demand different 
skills than the traditional monitoring skills (Bruining & Wright, 2002; Wright et al., 
2000a).  
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Early studies tended to treat private equity firms as a homogeneous group of 
investors, yet the resource and capability differences among this group of investors is 
increasingly recognized. Private equity firms differ considerably along several dimensions 
such as the identity of general and limited partners, reputation, previous experience, 
specialization, network configuration and investment styles  (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & 
Hellmann, 2004; Elango, Fried, Hisrich, & Polonchek, 1995; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & 
Lu, 2005; Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Munari, Cressy, & Malipiero, 2007). These differences 
likely have implications for selection of deals and for the performance of the post-buyout 
firm.  
More experienced private equity investors may be able to select better deals and 
are likely better both at monitoring the underlying investment and adding value by 
realizing growth opportunities (Baum & Silverman, 2004). More experienced private 
equity investors may be able to reduce pre-investment agency problems (adverse 
selection) that arise due to informational asymmetries about potential investees. They may 
thus be better able to identify investees that are better performing and/or which have the 
better performance prospects, including cases where they believe that their expertise will 
enable them to add most value. They may also have developed competencies in writing 
effective contracts to minimize agency costs (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). Similarly, 
more experienced private equity firms may also reduce agency problems that arise post-
investment (moral hazard) by being better able to monitor their investees. As such, 
experienced private equity investors will positively impact the value captured and the 
value created in a buyout transaction. Private equity firms with greater breadth and depth 
of prior experience will be less susceptible to being misled. Prior investment experience, 
therefore, may help overcome agency risk (De Clercq & Sapienza, 2005). Further, lower 
levels of informational asymmetries and more effective contracts likely increase the 
bargaining power of the private equity firm towards the different resource holders (Coff, 
1999). For example, there is some evidence that buyouts constitute a mechanism to 
renegotiate contracts with different stakeholders of the firm such as employees in order to 
transfer wealth to the investors (Ippolito & James, 1992). Overall, it is expected that more 
experienced investors will be better at monitoring the buyout firms, and, therefore, 
increase the value capture by realizing higher levels of profitability.  
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The private equity firm’s expertise and competencies with regard to strategy, 
operational and financial management, human resources, marketing policy, and mergers 
and acquisitions, also help create value for the buyout firm (Lee et al., 2001; Wright et al., 
2001b). For example, inside management does not always possess the tacit knowledge 
and idiosyncratic skills required to  seize new opportunities (Hendry, 2002). In situations 
where significant innovation is needed, it may be necessary to bring in outside managers 
who do possess these skills, as in a management buy-in or an investor-led buyout (Wright 
et al., 2001a). In these cases, private equity firms play an important role in assessing the 
skills of the incumbent managers and their potential replacements.  
Further, private equity backed buyouts can make use of the private equity firm’s 
extensive network and relationships: customers, suppliers, other investors, access to more 
sophisticated resources in banking, legal and other areas, etc. (Bradford & Smith, 1997). 
Though management buyouts generally require less investor involvement than earlier 
stage investments (Sapienza, Amason, & Manigart, 1994), buyouts with opportunities for 
value creation require greater involvement by the private equity provider, who may play 
an important role in developing entrepreneurial competencies. For such companies, the 
private equity investor contributes to top management decision making by keeping 
strategy on track, establishing new ventures/acquisitions, broadening market focus, and 
reviewing R&D, budgets and marketing plans (Bruining & Wright, 2002).  
The more experience private equity firms have, the larger will be the potential to 
create value. Private equity firms derive knowledge from prior investments and manifest 
their absorptive capacity in their evaluation, selection, and management of investment 
opportunities (De Clercq & Dimov, 2007). As private equity firms gain investment 
experience, they develop a broad range of knowledge about markets. General business 
experience provides many of the skills needed for exploiting an opportunity, including 
selling, negotiating, planning, decision making, problem solving, organizing and 
communicating. Further, the more investments private equity firms undertake, the larger 
will be the information network private equity firm’s can rely on. These contacts offer 
privileged access to expert advice which might help to realize growth opportunities 
(Hochberg et al., 2005; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).  
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This is important as one major task of private equity firms is recruiting highly 
qualified management for their portfolio companies. Additionally, more experienced 
investors will have access to more flexible debt arrangements (Cotter & Peck, 2001) 
which allow the buyout firm to take on more risky projects in order to realize growth 
opportunities. For example, buyout specialist are more likely to have access to long term 
debt arrangements, reducing interest and principal repayments in the short term allowing 
the PE investor flexibility to pursue growth opportunities. 
Overall, this discussion suggests that more experience will help to reduce agency 
related conflicts through improved monitoring and increase the value adding potential. 
Hence: 
 
H2a: The more experience the private equity firm has with buyout investing, the 
greater  will be the change in profitability. 
H2b: The more experience the private equity firm has with buyout investing, the 
greater will be the change in efficiency. 
H2c: The more experience the private equity firm has with buyout investing, the 
higher will be realized growth. 
 
Private equity firms differ considerably with respect to the number of private 
equity executives available to manage underlying portfolio companies (Cumming & 
Johan, 2007; Elango et al., 1995). The intensity of monitoring and value adding, 
therefore, varies among private equity firms. Entrepreneurial firms may require greater 
private equity involvement if they are to identify and exploit opportunities. Kanniainen 
and Keuschnigg (2003) point to an important trade-off between the number of firms in the 
portfolio of a private equity firm and the extent of managerial advice offered to these 
portfolio companies. By increasing the size of the portfolio with a fixed number of 
executives and associated limited time and specialist knowledge to add value, the amount 
of advice available per investee firm likely falls.  
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This likely reduces the prospects of the portfolio companies and thereby 
undermines the private equity firm’s returns from the portfolio of firms. Manigart et al. 
(2002) show that private equity firms with more intense monitoring seek higher returns 
for this costly effort. Cumming and Johan (2007) show empirically that venture capital 
firms with large portfolios per number of fund managers become less involved in the 
development of their ventures. In particular, their results indicate that venture capital 
firms with one extra entrepreneurial firm per manager in their portfolio provided on 
average 2-3 hours per month of less support and 20% less advice. Increasing the portfolio 
reduces both the monitoring and value adding by the venture capital firm. Therefore, it is 
expected that the performance of the buyout firm will be lower for private equity firms 
with more portfolio companies per investment manager. Hence: 
 
H3a: The more portfolio companies per private equity manager, the lower will be 
the change in profitability. 
H3b: The more portfolio companies per private equity manager, the lower will be 
the change in efficiency. 
H3c: The more portfolio companies per private equity manager, the lower will be 
realized growth. 
 
Private equity firms and type of transaction 
As discussed above, different types of buyouts offer different opportunities for 
efficiency changes and growth activities (Wright et al., 2001b). The extent to which 
private equity firms can add value by efficiency improvements and pursuing 
entrepreneurial opportunities, therefore, will depend on the type of deals in which they 
invest. As such, unique resources brought to the deal by experienced private equity firms 
will be more valuable for certain deals as compared to others. In the following paragraphs 
we focus on the distinct role private equity firms can play in divisional buyouts as 
compared to other private buyout transactions. 
 20 
Previous private equity investment experience is likely more important for deal 
selection and realizing efficiency improvements and firm growth in divisional buyouts. At 
deal selection, information availability is difficult for private firms but may be especially 
problematical for divisional buyouts. Separable data may be limited for divisions of larger 
groups, for example these entities may be cost centers without their own profit and loss 
accounts; this is less problematical for family firms and secondary buyouts which are 
stand-alone firms. More experienced private equity firms may be better able to analyze 
the underlying performance prospects of divisions.  
As argued previously, parental control problems and constraints on initiatives 
mean that divisional buyouts often create the potential for efficiency improvements and 
the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities (Wright et al., 2000a), and these 
problems are likely greater than in family of secondary buyouts. More experienced 
investors likely will be better at monitoring investees in order to reduce agency related 
problems and to bring efficiency up. Further, identifying and exploiting entrepreneurial 
opportunities involves high levels of uncertainty. When facing new opportunities, private 
equity firms use their knowledge to understand and evaluate them. In this process, 
absorptive capacity – the ability to recognize the value of new, external information, 
assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends – provides a key learning capability 
grounded in the firm’s prior knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Continuing action 
and experience in a particular industry creates deeper knowledge of that domain, which in 
turn enhances domain-specific learning and, consequently, the firm’s domain capabilities 
as a source of competitive advantage. Divisional buyouts that have been constrained by 
parental control systems may have potential absorptive capacity embodied in incumbent 
management teams but they lack the experience to identify and exploit opportunities 
effectively. In a buyout without private equity involvement, they may engage in costly, 
wasteful and time-consuming learning. Involvement by an experienced private equity 
firm may provide the capabilities that avoid such problems (Zahra & George, 2002; 
Zahra, Sapienza, & Davidsson, 2006).  
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To summarize, previous investment experience will be especially valuable in 
divisional buyouts as it enhances a private equity firm’s monitoring skills and its 
absorptive capacity which enhance its ability to monitor investees and to successfully 
identify and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. Hence: 
 
H4a:  The positive relationship between the experience of the private equity firm 
and the change in profitability of the buyout firm will be greater for divisional than for 
other buyouts. 
H4b:  The positive relationship between the experience of the private equity firm 
and the change in efficiency of the buyout firm will be greater for divisional than for other 
buyouts. 
H4c: The positive relationship between the experience of the private equity firm 
and the growth of the buyout firm will be greater for divisional buyouts than for other 
buyouts. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data collection 
The empirical setting employed in this study is the UK market for private equity 
backed buyout transactions over the period 1993-2003. The UK private equity market is 
the largest and most dynamic in Europe accounting for some 52% of the whole European 
private equity market in 2004 and is second in size only to the United States on the world 
stage (Wright et al., 2007). We combine three different data sources to analyze our 
hypotheses. First, data on individual deal characteristics are drawn from a unique, hand 
collected dataset maintained by the Centre for Management Buy-out Research (CMBOR). 
This database covers the entire population of buyouts in the UK. The population of 
private equity backed firms during the period 1993 to 2003 was 2,428. Second, these data 
are then combined with characteristics of private equity firms collected through 
directories issued by the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) and the European 
Venture Capital Association (EVCA).  
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Third, for each buyout firm we collected accounting information from FAME, a 
commercial database containing information on public and private companies in the UK. 
Accessing these databases prior to 1993 was problematical. We ended our coverage in 
2003 to enable us to measure three years of post buyout profitability and growth (see 
below). After combining these different data sources, we obtained a sample of 238 private 
equity backed buyout transactions on which full information is available. In total 45 
different private equity firms were involved in these transactions. The sample is 
representative of the full population of private buyouts in terms of deal vendor source and 
size. The percentage of divisional buyouts closely approximates the population average 
(47% versus 45%). The median size of the buyouts included in the sample is also very 
close to the median buyout in the population (£6.7 million versus £6.9 million). The 
percentage of management buy-ins is lower than the population average (13% versus 
21%); management buy-ins are generally riskier and more likely to fail, making it more 
difficult to track them.  
 
Variables  
Dependent variables 
As mentioned earlier, agency theory’s focus on profit maximization confounds the 
sources of improvements in performance as performance is a multi-dimensional construct 
(e.g. Hitt, 1988; Delmar et al., 2003). Therefore, several performance measures are used 
as dependent variables in this study. Profitability, as a measure of performance, may 
increase following a buyout as a result of value creation and/or value capture (Coff, 
1999). Value creation can be distinguished in terms of improved efficiency (typically 
measured by productivity) and increased effectiveness. Efficiency relates to an input-
output ratio or comparison, that is, by getting more out of the resources the firm uses. 
Effectiveness concerns an absolute level of input acquisitions or outcome attainment such 
as growth (Goodman & Pennings, 1977; Ostroff & Schmitt, 1993). 
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To measure profitability we use ROCE (return on capital employed).2 ROCE takes 
into consideration the net capital resources available to generate operating profits, after 
allowing for current liabilities as part of working capital. ROCE is calculated by dividing 
operating profits by total assets from which current liabilities were subtracted. We use the 
absolute change in value of ROCE from the year of the buyout till 3 year after the buyout 
as dependent variable. In order to control for macroeconomic and industry factors outside 
buyout firms’ control we adjust the change in ROCE by subtracting the change in the 
four-digit SIC industry average. 
Though financial profitability is important, some behavioral aspects motivated 
from agency and entrepreneurial perspectives are not captured by such measures. We, 
therefore, use some measures that capture the efficiency and growth of the buyout firm. In 
order to measure efficiency, we use the sales per employee ratio.3 Change in sales per 
employee is measured as the percentage change in sales per employee from the year of 
the buyout till three year after the buyout. This measure is industry adjusted in order to 
control for industry-wide factors that account for efficiency changes. 
Sales and employment growth are widely used indicators in empirical analyses of 
entrepreneurial growth (Delmar et al., 2003). In addition, they capture different aspects of 
how firms grow. Sales growth will capture entrepreneurial growth activity that leads to 
additional revenue being created. For this to occur, a contemporaneous increase in 
employment might also be observed. However, if given labor resources are better utilized 
to create additional sales revenues (see above) sales growth may not lead to employment 
growth. We include employment growth to capture growth in labor resources and as an 
indicator of growth in the size of the firm (Delmar et al., 2003). We use average sales 
revenue growth and the average growth in number of employees in the 3 years following 
the buyout (Munari et al., 2007). Both growth measures are industry adjusted by 
calculating them relative to the four-digit SIC average. 
 
                                                 
 
2
 As a robustness test we also used Return on Assets (ROA) as a measure of profitability. The results were 
substantially similar and are therefore not reported here but are available from the authors. 
3
 We also used percentage change in value added per employee as a measure of efficiency but none of the 
results were significant and are therefore not reported here. 
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Independent variables 
Several independent variables are used in the analyses. First, in order to capture 
the source of the buyout transaction, we include different dummy variables. A distinction 
is made between divisional (divisional) and other buyouts (other buyout); as discussed 
earlier, the other category includes secondary buyouts and private/family buyouts. 
Second, private equity experience is measured by counting the cumulative number of 
buyout investments for each investor. This measure includes investments from the early 
eighties onwards as recorded in the CMBOR dataset (De Clercq & Dimov, 2007). The 
logarithm of this measure is used as this variable is highly skewed (PE experience). The 
intensity of value adding and monitoring is measured by dividing the total number of 
portfolio companies managed by a specific private equity firm by the number of 
investment executives employed by the private equity firm (Cumming & Johan, 2007) 
(investments/executive).  
 
Control variables 
In the regression analyses, we include several control variables related to the 
private equity firm and the buyout company. First, we include a dummy variable that 
indicates whether the deal is syndicated or not (syndication). Previous literature has 
shown that firms syndicate their deals in order to gain access to resources from other 
private equity firms. This might have a positive impact on the performance of syndicated 
transactions (Manigart et al., 2006). We control for the extent of specialization of the 
private equity firm by calculating a specialization index, derived from similar measures in 
the literature on international trade specialization and international technology 
specialization (specialization) (Munari et al., 2007). This index is computed as the share 
of buyout investments (in number of companies) of a private equity firm in a given 
industry divided by the private equity firm’s share (in number of companies) in the total 
private equity backed buyout industry. The industry classification comprises 35 different 
industries. The index is equal to zero if the private equity firm holds no portfolio of 
companies in a given industry, is equal to 1 when the private equity firm’s share in the 
sector is equal to its share in all fields, and grows rapidly when a positive specialization is 
found, the upper limit depending on the total distribution being used.  
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We take the logarithm of the specialization measure as it is highly skewed. We 
also include a dummy variable indicating whether the private equity firm was an 
independent investor because independent firms have higher return requirements 
compared to captives and other type of investors and, therefore, might seek to increase the 
performance of their portfolio companies more compared to other investors (Manigart et 
al., 2002) (independent).  
The extent of managerial ownership has been shown to impact firm performance 
following buyouts. As suggested by Kaplan and Stein (1993), we include the absolute 
amount invested by the management of the buyout firm (management investment). 
Further, in order to control for the disciplining effect created by high levels of senior debt, 
we include the gearing of the buyout firm which equals the total amount of senior debt 
divided by the total amount of equity used to structure the buyout transaction (gearing). 
To take into account scale effects on post-buyout performance, we include buyout firms’ 
size. Size is measured by sales revenue in the year of the buyout (sales_0). To control for 
the effect of previous profitability levels, we include ROCE in the year of the buyout 
(ROCE_0). There might be a concern that private equity firms with more experience are 
better at selecting the best deals than those with less experience. Ideally, forward looking 
information may be helpful in distinguishing the best deals, but as this is only available in 
business plans, it was not accessible to us. In order to distinguish between value adding 
and selection, therefore, we use a common approach to examine if there are lead effects in 
the buyout firm (Amess, 2003; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990). By examining performance 
and growth prior to a private equity backed buyout, it is possible to determine whether 
private equity firms are selecting the best deals. As we examine private firms, information 
disclosure restrictions for divisional cases in particular mean that our data are limited in 
that we can only determine performance and growth at the time of the buyout. 
Nevertheless, we interact the PE experience variable with our profitability variable in 
order to determine if PE backed buyouts had a higher level of profitability at the time of 
the buyout. In order to test whether performance improvements are driven by a strategy of 
acquisitions, we include a variable that captures the number of acquisitions a buyout firm 
was involved in (# Acquisitions).  
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Given the heterogeneity of buyout types as outlined above, dummy variables are 
included to capture these; a distinction is made between management buyouts (MBO 
dummy), management buy-ins (MBI dummy), a combination of a buy-in and a buyout 
(BIMBO dummy)4 and investor-led buyouts (IBO dummy). Management buyouts are the 
omitted reference category. Lastly, we introduce year dummies to control for unobserved 
factors that affect the dependent variables over time that are common to all firms. 
 
Descriptive Data 
The summary statistics for the buyout transactions and the private equity firms 
involved in those transactions are shown in Table 1. The average industry adjusted change 
in ROCE in the three years following the buyouts amounts to minus 2.74 percentage 
points. The median change is positive and equals 2%. When looking at the percentage 
change in sales per employee, buyout firms perform on average 10.24% better than the 
industry average. Average yearly sales growth in the three years following the buyout 
transaction equals 13.35% which is considerably higher than the industry average. The 
average yearly growth in number of employees is 3.37%, which is higher than the 
industry average.  
 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
The cumulative number of previous investments by private equity firms in our 
sample is on average 108. As the standard deviation indicates, there are huge differences 
between the private equity firms in the sample. One investor, namely 3i, was involved in 
1320 investments in the year prior to its investments. The average number of investments 
per investment executive equals 19.58 (median = 12). This number is considerably higher 
compared to figures reported for early stage venture capital firms (Cumming & Johan, 
2007).  
                                                 
 
4
 A BIMBO is a combination of management buy-out and buy-in where the management team 
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Insert Table 2 About Here 
The correlation matrix for the variables used in the analyses is in Table 2. The 
correlations between all the variables used in the regression analyses are below 0.70 
suggesting there are no multicollinearity problems. Furthermore, variance inflation scores 
do not indicate problems of multicollinearity.5  
 
RESULTS 
To test hypotheses 1 to 4, we run OLS regressions with robust standard errors in 
order to deal with problems of heteroskedasticity. In separate analyses not reported here 
we also estimate ‘treatment effects models’ in order to correct and test for possible bias 
arising from the self-selection of private equity backed buyout transactions. The results 
are similar however.6 Our dependent variables are change in ROCE, sales / employee, 
sales growth and employee growth. The regression results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
In models 1 and 2, we employ ROCE as dependent variable. Likelihood ratio tests 
indicate the independent variables in all models are jointly significant and R-squares 
indicate that the models are a reasonable fit of the data. Model 1 shows that ROCE in the 
year of the buyout has a negative impact on the change in ROCE following the buyout 
whereas the age of the buyout firm and the number of acquisitions the buyout firm was 
involved in have a significant positive impact. In model 2, the variables of interest are 
added. Only the intensity of follow-up, as measured by the investment per executive, is 
significant and has the expected sign, lending support to hypothesis 3a.  
                                                                                                                                                  
 
that buys the business includes both existing management and new managers. 
5
 These are not included in the paper but are available on request from the authors. 
6
 In the two step Heckman model we first predict the probability that a buyout firm will be private 
equity backed using the size and profitability of the buyout firms as predictors. These are 
available on request from the authors.  
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The size of the coefficient indicates that adding one investment per executive 
decreases the change in ROCE with 0.45 percentage points. None of the other variables is 
significant however. Hypotheses 1a and 2a are not supported. 
In models 3 and 4, we use sales per employee as dependent variable. Both 
profitability and the absolute amount invested by management have a significant negative 
impact on the performance change in sales per employee following the buyout. In line 
with hypothesis 1b, our results indicate that efficiency increases, as measured by change 
in the sales per employee, are higher in divisional buyouts as compared to other types of 
buyouts. The economic effect is substantial: the percentage change in sales per employee 
is on average 13% higher in a divisional buyout as compared to other types of private 
buyouts. Our private equity related variables are not significant however. Overall, there is 
some support for hypothesis 1b; however, hypotheses 2b and 3b are not supported.  
In model 5 and 6 we use sales growth as dependent variable.  Divisional buyouts 
experience no significant higher sales growth as compared to private/family buyouts. 
Therefore, hypothesis 1c is not supported using this measure. The coefficient of the 
experience of the investor is highly significant and has the expected sign. The more 
experience an investor has, the higher sales growth following the buyout, consistent with 
hypothesis 2c. The economic effect is significant: a 1% increase in the experience of the 
investor, will lead to a 0.08 percentage point increase in sales growth following the 
buyout. Further, a lower intensity of follow-up (measured by the number of investments 
managed per executive) is associated with lower sales growth following the buyout. This 
is in line with hypothesis 3c.  
Models 7 and 8 in Table 3 use employment growth in the three years following the 
buyout as a growth measure. Model 7 shows that buyout firms backed by independent PE 
firms have higher levels of employment growth. In model 8, we introduce the variables of 
interest. Divisional buyouts show significantly higher levels of growth in line with 
hypothesis 1c. The growth in number of employees following a buyout is on average 36 
percentage points higher in divisional buyouts as compared to other types of private 
buyouts. The results indicate that highly experienced private equity investors experience 
significantly higher levels of growth at their portfolio of companies. This is in line with 
hypothesis 2c.  
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Again, the economic effect is significant: a 1% increase in the experience of the 
investor, will lead to a 0.24 percentage point increase in employee growth following the 
buyout. Furthermore, lower intensity of follow-up is associated with lower employment 
growth following the buyout, which supports hypothesis 3c. 
 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
In the analyses presented in Table 4, we introduce an interaction term between the 
experience of the investor and the type of the buyout. The variables used in the interaction 
term are centered. Models 1 and 2 show no significant interaction effect. As such 
hypotheses 4a and 4b with respect to profitability and efficiency are not supported. 
Models 3 and 4 with sales growth and employee growth as dependent variables provide 
strong support for hypothesis 4c. Investor experience is especially important for realizing 
firm growth in divisional buyouts.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this study we have synthesized agency and strategic entrepreneurship 
perspectives to provide complementary insights into three research questions concerning 
private equity backed buyouts:  (1) how do different types of private equity backed 
buyout transactions impact post-buyout performance, specifically how does the 
performance of divisional buyouts differ from other private buyouts; (2) how do 
differences in private equity firm experience and intensity of post-buyout involvement 
impact on the performance of firms undergoing a buyout; and (3) does private equity firm 
experience impact differently on the performance of divisional buyouts  than for other 
private buyout types? These research questions were addressed using a unique hand-
collected dataset of 238 private equity backed buyouts in the UK between 1993 and 2003. 
To summarize our findings in relation to the first research question, divisional 
buyouts are not associated with significant changes in profitability as compared to other 
types of buyouts.  
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However, divisional buyouts are associated with increases in efficiency, measured 
by sales per employee, and growth, as measured by employee growth. The effects are 
economically significant. For example, the results indicated that the growth in number of 
employees following a buyout is on average 36 percentage points higher in divisional 
buyouts as compared to other types of private buyouts. With respect to our second 
research question, our analysis indicated that private equity firm experience is not related 
to higher levels of profitability or efficiency. However, higher levels of PE firm 
experience are associated with higher levels of growth at the buyout firm. These effects 
are economically significant. Further, the intensity of follow-up was negatively associated 
with changes in profitability and growth following the buyout.  Lastly, with respect to our 
third research question, we found strong support that PE firm experience is mainly 
important in achieving growth in divisional buyouts as compared to other types of 
buyouts. Overall, we find stronger support for the effects of divisional buyouts and 
private equity firm experience on value creation, especially growth and to a lesser extent 
efficiency. Among our control variables, we find that undertaking acquisition activity is 
significantly associated with profitability but not with growth.  
This study contributes to the literature on buyouts and private equity investing 
specifically, and the strategic entrepreneurship literature in general in several ways. 
Previous literature on buyouts, which has primarily involved public to private 
transactions, has tended to analyze profitability and efficiency changes rather than growth 
(Kaplan, 1989). Our analysis of divisional buyouts shows that value creation through 
post-buyout growth is particularly important. Whereas previous literature has 
acknowledged differences among private equity firms (Elango et al., 1995; Kaplan & 
Schoar, 2005; Munari et al., 2007), few studies have actually looked at the impact of these 
differences on the performance of portfolio companies. Our results indicate that general 
investment experience has a positive impact on the performance of the buyout firm, 
especially in terms of growth. In line with Cumming and Johan (2007), our results show 
that the extent of value adding delivered by private equity firms decreases when 
investment executives have to manage larger portfolios. This clearly has a negative 
impact on the growth of the post-buyout firm.  
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These results emphasize the resources and capabilities that buyout specialists 
bring in terms of monitoring and advice provision to their portfolio companies. 
While previous studies have mainly focused on the role of private equity firms in 
early stage transactions (Hellmann & Puri, 2002), the results of this study show that 
private equity firms can play a major role in fostering growth in later stage buyout firms. 
These findings add to the buyout and private equity literature since they provide more 
fine-grained insights than hitherto about how some private equity firms are more skilled 
at implementing otherwise common monitoring and advisory devices (Barney et al., 
2001). In general, our findings help to extend the strategic entrepreneurship perspective to 
the buyout and private equity context. The findings also complement the traditionally 
dominant agency theory perspective helping to enhance understanding of those buyouts 
which have growth prospects. Specifically, our findings in respect of divisional buyouts 
provide empirical evidence suggesting synergies between enhanced governance and 
greater access to resources and capabilities (Makadok, 2003). The greater strength of our 
findings in respect of growth rather than profitability or efficiency indicate that in these 
cases, incorporating a resource-based strategic entrepreneurship perspective is particularly 
important. 
The study has some limitations that suggest avenues for further research. First, we 
have undertaken limited analysis of the extent to which buyout firms use internal or 
external (acquisition) strategies to realize firm growth and to fill gaps in resources and 
capabilities but found that acquisition activity, while associated with higher profitability, 
does not appear to be strongly associated with greater growth.  Previous research has 
indicated that different types of investors have different preferences with respect to the 
type of growth strategies of firms (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002) and this 
is an area for further research. For example, further research might consider trying to 
obtain data on the extent of internal versus external growth strategies employed by buyout 
firms or the innovativeness of buyouts’ growth strategies. Second, we have used a 
restricted set of measures of efficiency and entrepreneurial activity. Further research 
might usefully examine further measures. For example, the percentage of sales exported 
might be used as a measure of entrepreneurial activity since exporting is viewed as a risky 
activity (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).  
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Third, while we have examined some dimensions of the differences among private 
equity firms, other dimensions may yield useful insights regarding entrepreneurial 
activity. For example, private equity firms with international experience may be better 
able to assist investees with growth efforts, especially internationalization. Fourth, while 
we have recognized that the relationship between better performance and experienced 
private equity firms may be related to both better deal selection and better monitoring and 
advice, it is problematical to separate out the relative importance of each of these aspects. 
Baum and Silverman (2004), for example, find for early stage biotechnology ventures that 
venture capital investors create value by picking the right ventures and adding value after 
the investments has been made. Further, Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) show that 
reputable buyout investors are especially good at timing their investments. It would be 
interesting if future research in the buyout area could investigate the relative importance 
of selecting versus value adding in more detail. 
Our analysis has implications for managers and private equity firms involved in 
buyouts. In particular, differences in the contributions that private equity firms  can make 
suggests that managers and their advisors need to take considerable care in selecting 
financial backers for their prospective buyout because they have differing capacity to fill 
the gaps in buyout firms’ resources and capabilities. Further, our findings emphasize the 
need for private equity firms to recruit executives with the expertise to seek and exploit 
growth opportunities rather than solely monitoring skills (Lockett, Murray, & Wright, 
2002). The performance differences observed between divisional buyouts and other 
private buyouts suggest that private equity firms may need to consider deal targeting more 
carefully. Finally, our findings also speak to the current policy controversy over the 
sources of gains in buyouts (e.g. Treasury Select Committee, 2007); for an important 
sector of the private equity market, the view that gains are due principally to cost cutting 
and efficiency gains is misplaced. Attempts to restrict private equity backed buyouts may 
mean that growth opportunities with wider economic and social benefits are foregone.    
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TABLE 1 
Descriptives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             a In million £. 
 
 
 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Change ROCE  238 -4.40 65.62 -342.77 241.69 
Change ROCE industry adjusted 238 -2.74 65.76 -334.43 246.79 
Change sales / employee  (%) 238 19.29 63.44 76.50 617.34 
Percentage change sales / employee 
industry adjusted (%) 238 10.24 69.04 -309.83 598.93 
Average sales growth (%) 238 13.35 75.62 -39 1000.88 
Average sales growth industry 
adjusted (%) 238 5.46 19.47 -58.33 97.44 
Average employee growth (%) 238 5.85 17.62 -44.6 166.16 
Average employee growth industry 
adjusted (%) 238 6.90 18.47 -49.42 167.26 
PE experience  238 108 448.63 1 1320 
Investments/executive 238 19.58 21.47 0.16 72.72 
Syndication 238 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Independent  238 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Specialization 238 1.17 1.60 0.00 22.26 
Management investment a 238 0.22 0.45 0 2.87 
Gearing 238 228.99 402.98 0.10 2709.89 
Logarithm sales_0 238 2.65 1.03 0.35 7.36 
ROCE_0 238 0.13 0.21 -1.29 2.20 
# Acquisitions 238 0.11 0.45 0 4 
MBO dummy 238 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
MBI dummy 238 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
IBO dummy 238 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
BIMBO dummy 238 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Private dummy 238 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Divisional  238 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Secondary  238 0.09 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Other buyout 238 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
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Table 2: Pearson Correlations (N=238) 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Change ROCE industry 
adjusted 1             
2. Change sales / employee 
industry adjusted (%) 0.19* 1            
3. Average sales growth industry 
adjusted (%) 0.11 -0.06 1           
4. Average employee growth 
industry adjusted (%) -0.03 -0.09 0.97* 1          
5. PE experience -0.07 -0.03 0.11 0.09 1         
6. Investments/executive -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.57* 1        
7. Specialization 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.17* -0.09 1       
8. Management investment  -0.06 -0.12 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 1      
9. Gearing -0.03 0.09 0.24* 0.25* 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 1     
10. Sales_0 0.08 0.08 -0.13 -0.15* -0.12* -0.17* 0.03 0.11 0.12* 1    
11. ROCE_0 -0.36* -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.08 -0.05 1   
12. Age firm 0.11 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.24* -0.07 1  
13. # Acquisitions 0.08 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.14* -0.04 -0.02 0.10 -0.06 0.13* -0.00 0.01 1 
*p≤0.05;               
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Table 3: OLS Regression Efficiency and Growth of the Buyout Firm (N=238)a 
† p<0.10,*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001  
   a All the dependent variables are industry-adjusted. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent variable Change ROCE Change ROCE Change sales / 
employee 
Change sales / 
employee Sales growth Sales growth 
Employee 
growth Employee growth 
Independent variables Estimate Robust 
S.E. 
Estimate Robust 
S.E. Estimate 
Robust 
S.E. Estimate 
Robust 
S.E. Estimate 
Robust 
S.E. Estimate 
Robust 
S.E. Estimate 
Robust 
S.E. Estimate 
Robust 
S.E. 
Divisional   2.28 5.94   0.13* 0.06 
  
0.05 0.05 
  
0.36** 0.11 
PE experience   2.79 2.46   -0.02 0.04 
  
0.08*** 0.02 
  
0.24*** 0.05 
Investments/executive   -0.45* 0.19   0.00 0.00   -0.01** 0.00   -0.02*** 0.00 
Control variables                 
Syndication 9.73 13.56 10.41 13.75 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.18 -0.02 0.21 
Specialization 2.12 9.18 1.70 9.80 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.16 0.03 0.15 
Independent  -3.70 3.97 -0.08 5.73 -0.05 0.08 -0.04 0.10 0.10† 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.44* 0.17 0.50* 0.20 
Management investment -7.28 5.79 -5.94 5.72 -0.21** 0.07 -0.18* 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.20† 0.12 
Gearing_0 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00† 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
Sales_0 0.32 2.39 -0.60 3.20 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.10 0.06 -0.10 0.07 -0.52† 0.26 -0.54* 0.27 
ROCE_0 -0.60*** 0.10 -0.61*** 0.10 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
ROCE_0 * PE experience  -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 
Age firm 0.28* 0.14 0.31* 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
# Acquisitions 10.70*** 3.00 9.90** 2.97 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.12*** 0.03 0.07† 0.04 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.13 
MBI dummy 4.48 11.83 3.48 12.55 -0.10 0.07 -0.07 0.08 -0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.08 -0.26 0.20 -0.18 0.19 
IBO dummy 22.71 24.76 22.18 25.15 0.25 0.20 0.23 0.19 -0.27* 0.12 -0.24* 0.11 -0.58 0.39 -0.56 0.37 
BIMBO dummy -7.22 9.59 -7.63 9.49 -0.09 0.14 -0.07 0.14 -0.22 0.17 -0.25 0.19 -0.38 0.42 -0.24 0.51 
P-value of likelihood 
ratio test 
p < 0.001 
 
p < 0.001 
 
p < 0.001  p < 0.001  p < 0.001  p < 0.001  p < 0.001  p < 0.001  
R-Square 0.27  0.28  0.11 
 
0.12 
 
0.16  0.18  0.15  0.17  
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Table 4: OLS Regression Private Equity Heterogeneity and Source of Transaction (N=238)a  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
     
 
                                    
               
† 
p<0.10,*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001     a All the dependent variables are industry-adjusted. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Dependent variable Change ROCE Change Sales / 
employee 
Sales growth Employee growth 
Independent variables Estimate Robust S.E. Estimate 
Robust 
S.E. Estimate 
Robust 
S.E. Estimate 
Robust 
S.E. 
Divisional 4.55 7.38 0.14† 0.07 -0.13 0.11 -0.10 0.21 
PE experience  4.74$ 2.42 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.06 
PE experience * Divisional -4.15 3.48 0.00 0.03 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
Investments/executive -0.45* 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
Control variables         
Syndication 10.09 13.74 -0.03 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.17 
Specialization 1.62 9.79 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.07 
Independent  -0.49 5.68 -0.04 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.29* 0.16 
Management investment -5.76 5.74 -0.18* 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.17 
Gearing_0 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00† 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
Sales_0 -0.67 3.23 0.03 0.05 -0.12 0.08 -0.58† 0.30 
ROCE_0 -0.61*** 0.10 -0.00* 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
ROCE_0 * PE experience  -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 
Age firm 0.30* 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
# Acquisitions 9.95** 3.04 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.14 
MBI dummy 3.13 12.59 -0.07 0.08 -0.02 0.07 -0.21 0.20 
IBO dummy 20.32 24.93 0.23 0.19 -0.08 0.08 -0.18 0.28 
BIMBO dummy -6.95 9.47 -0.07 0.14 -0.25 0.17 -0.25 0.46 
P-value of likelihood ratio test p < 0.001  p < 0.001  p < 0.001  p < 0.001  
R-Square 0.28  0.12  0.18  0.17  
